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TAX SHELTERS AND THE TAX MINIMIZATION NORM:
HOW DOES THE PATENTING OF TAX ADVICE
TRANSFORM THE (GLOBAL) PLAYING FIELD
LINDA M. BEALE*
ABSTRACT
The U.S. tax administration began a new era of enforcement by
focusing on "cloned" tax shelters that were marketed by ambitious
accounting and tax law firms to small groups of customers. That focus
led to heightened transparency requirements-new disclosure rules,
higher standards for tax reporting, and stiffer penalties. Even the
courts, which had seemed reluctant to apply judicial doctrines to stop
aggressive tax structuring, have appeared to grow new backbone in
this age of stiffer enforcement expectations. Just at the time when it
appears that the attention to tax shelter activity may reduce the amount
of aggressive planning, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has
thrown a wrench into the machinery by issuing a series of patents on
tax planning strategies, after the State Street decision opened the way
for business method patents.
The patenting of tax strategies may have significant effects
well beyond the questions of royalties, liabilities for infringement, or
difficulties of litigating against validity of a tax patent that are already
the subject of discussion among tax practitioners and academics. There
are concerns, in particular, that the ability to patent legal processes
relating to tax liabilities may make it more difficult for taxpayers to
comply with the law. This essay will briefly review the concerns
raised by tax strategy patents, including ethical questions confronting
practitioners who hold a tax strategy patent, the potential impact of tax
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patents on the development of the underlying "tax minimization norm"
that this author has noted in earlier papers as a significant factor in tax
shelter activity, and the anti-competitive effects of multijurisdictional
tax strategy patents
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the United Nations promoted world peace
through the removal of trade barriers. This process of trade
liberalization has progressed rapidly, leading to today's globally
integrated economy, with financial, communications, and
manufacturing activities operating across national boundaries. E-
commerce brings businesses and their customers together across the
globe; marketplaces are increasingly international, not national or
local. Yesterday's competitor becomes tomorrow's joint venturer,
each governed by the various regulatory and tax jurisdictions that may
apply to a single commercial transaction.
Globalization of markets has clearly brought with it an
accelerating trend towards globalization of the legal rules underlying
those markets. Even in areas that have traditionally been considered
strongly territorial in nature and left to the jurisdiction of the different
nations, such as bankruptcy, there has been considerable discussion, at
the least, of the value of universalism in rules and consistency across
borders in order to facilitate the smooth functioning of the global
marketplace and avoid conflicting treatments of multinational players.
The trend towards harmonization seems particularly evident in
areas that have traditionally demanded at least a minimal level of
transnational cooperation, such as tax. Globalization has accelerated
the development of bilateral tax conventions to avoid double or no
taxation because of extraterritorial activities and the adoption by
emerging economies of sophisticated tax concepts that are relatively
common in developed countries, such as rules governing conduit
1. See, e.g., Robert Rasmussen, Where Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies? The
Puzzling Case for Universalism (Vand. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
7-13, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982678 (stating that
"[u]niversalism is on the march" and that after a century of a "quixotic quest", "[t]he
tide has seemingly turned").
financing arrangements and controlled foreign corporation regimes
similar to the U.S. scheme for taxing currently certain profits earned
overseas. Some evidence points to convergence in rate structures and
types of taxes, though the array of possible taxing systems and
territorial differences makes true convergence or universalism in tax
law highly unlikely.
Accompanying the development of these globalized markets is
a rapidly developing international interest in the intellectual property
rights that underlie the global economy. In fact, in many ways one
might argue that the future of globalization lies in the resolution of
issues related to these intangible property rights. They raise a number
of difficult issues, from determination of which nation has (or should
have) jurisdiction to tax the profits from exercising these intangible
rights to the proper scope of a right granted by one nation. On the one
hand, market globalization creates significant pressure for
harmonization of intellectual property rights-a trademark that is
meaningful in one country is worth much less than one than can be
enforced consistently across national boundaries. Accordingly, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),2 as interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body, moves towards
harmonized trademark protection across national jurisdictions.3
On the other hand, a competitive war has developed in the
United States in which the "most visible battlefield" is the courtroom,
where companies engage in patent litigation over the rights to
2. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15
1994, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/tagme.htm. The.United States
committed to minimal standards of patent protection in the TRIPS Agreement in
connection with establishment of the World Trade Organization.
3. See, e.g., Gail E. Evans, Substantive Trademark Law Harmonization by Means of
the WTO Appellate Body and the European Court of Justice: The Case of Trade
Name Protection, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=965891 (noting the "advent of a
global epoch in trademark rights" with an increasing need for trademark law
harmonization and suggesting that the disputes settlement understanding provides
"an opportunity to penetrate and if necessary to amend national trademark laws that
are found inconsistent").
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ownership of particular business methods, patentable under U.S.
patent laws after the State Street Bank decision, that may determine
4who controls key technologies and processes in the global economy.
Financial institutions-key players in the development of the global
economy-have become eager participants in the burgeoning business
method patent process, developing brokerage, investment banking and
asset management patents covering software applications to business
methodologies. This has led to an "increasingly impenetrable 'patent
thicket' of complicated, vague and overlapping claims." 6
Patents provide two distinct benefits-royalties from licensing
the patent and exclusion rights. With business method patents, both
these benefits of patents create opportunities for market-distorting
transaction costs. The fee or royalty rewards an inventor who licenses
a company to use the new process in a commercial enterprise. There
are also rising numbers of "patent trolls," companies that purchase
patents from the holder in order to demand revenues or infringement
awards from large companies when they inadvertently infringe on the
patent, rather than to facilitate the commercialization of the new
4. Joel E. Lutzker & Anna Vishev, Patents on Wall Street, IP Worldwide, December
13, 2002, at 20, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1039054440840
(discussing the impact, in just a few short years, of State Street Bank & Trust v.
Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), which permitted
patenting of business methods).
5. See, e.g., Barry Grossman, Patents Now Play Important Role in Financial
Industry, 169 Am. Banker 10 (Dec. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.foley.com/files/tbls31 Publications/FileUpload 1 37/2436/3854ab.pdf.
(indicating increase of financial services patents from 330 in 1995 to 8,700 in 2001);
Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdups and Royalty Stacking
(John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stan. Law Sch. Working Paper No. 345,
August, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1005727.
6. Peter Haapaniemi, Have We Lost Our Way?, Ip Bus., Spring/Summer 2006, at 4
available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/660695fl 
-b 168-4618-
a7aa-062f492d643b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6ce9b7cc-020c-402f-a734-
11 f234a8fdcd/IPBiz_2006_SpringSummer.pdf.
patented idea.7 Business method patents also are highly effective anti-
competition measures, in that they permit the holder to exclude others
from using the patented methodology to execute a similar business, a
much broader scope for monopoly protection than generally
envisioned when one considers patents on particular types of
machines. They effectively secure protection for the life of the patent
against level-playing-field competition with the patent holder by
providing a monopoly on a particular method of doing business, 8
changing the role of patents from "fuel for the engine to sand in the
gears."
9
The possibility of patenting business methods raises concerns
beyond the economic. For example, the patenting of medical processes
raised ethical concerns about the physician-patient relationship, the
autonomy of physicians, and the potentially deleterious effect on
development of new medical knowledge as researchers "hog" their
work to develop lucrative patents rather than share their work with
others through objective reporting in scientific journals.' 0 Those
concerns were countered to the extent that the availability of medical
process patents incentivized physicians, hospitals, and other
organizations to conduct costly clinical research. Ultimately, Congress
enacted an exceVtion for surgical method patents that immunizes
direct infringers.
7. Haapaniemi, supra note 6 at 6. (reporting Berkeley professor Carl Shapiro's
concern that often these patent trolls have nothing to lose, resulting in "asymmetric
warfare" in pursuit of infringement claims).
8. See Haapaniemi, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing Amazon.com's suit against
bamesandnoble.com enforcing its patent on the "one-click method" for internet
sales). See also Edmund Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 Res. L.
Econ. 31 (1986) (noting that patents confer monopoly power only to the extent that
there are no close substitutes for the patented item).
9. Haapaniemi, supra note 6, at 7. (quoting Brandeis economist Adam Jaffe).
10. See, e.g., Gregory F. Burch, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical
Processes, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1139 (1987) (discussing ethical concerns and legislative
remedies relating to medical process patents.
11. Physicians Immunity Statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1996). The amendment
generally denies damages or injunctive relief against licensed medical practitioners
or related health care facilities in connection with the performance of a medical
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The most recent development in the area of business method
patents is the possibility of patenting tax planning strategies. The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has already
issued a number of these patents and there are applications for many
more in line for patent review.' 2 Issuance of a patent does not certify
the strategy as legitimately carrying the intended tax consequences
under federal tax law, which is a determination made by the Internal
Revenue Service (the IRS) and the courts rather than the USPTO. 13
There are a number of other economic, ethical and practical concerns
with tax patents. Various commentators have considered the impact of
tax planning patents on tax planning professionals and firms and the
social consequences of such patents.1 4 The American Bar Association
Tax Section, for example, has devoted considerable time over the last
two years to questions related to tax strategy patents, including the
establishment of a task force to explore the patenting of tax-related
advice. 15 Various state bar associations, accountancy groups and
activity that constitutes an infringement of a patent, but not covering patented
machines or biotechnology.
12. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website maintains a list of patents that are
classified as data processing (Class 705) tax strategies (36T) at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/class705_sub36t.html.
13. In theory, one should not be able to patent an unlawful transaction. However,
the USPTO generally presents its work as focusing on the specific patent law
requirements and not on questions of the legal validity of the activity sought to be
patented.
14. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Brett McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm,
(University of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series Res. Paper No. 07-05,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=961749 (suggesting that tax planning
firms may benefit but the overall social consequences of such patents are
"potentially negative on net").
15. See, e.g., Stephen Joyce, Number of Tax Strategy Patents Increasing, Could
Affect Practice of Law, Speakers Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 24, 2006, at G-9
(commenting on the ABA's October 20 plenary session on tax patents and the
establishment of a task force on tax strategy patents); Dustin A. Stamper, ABA
Suggests Making Patented Tax Strategies Reportable Transactions, 2007 TNT 36-1,
Feb. 22, 2007, available in LEXIS, TNT File.
others have weighed in on the controversy. 16 As tax patents have
became more visible, Congress has recognized their importance,
holding a series of hearings on issues related to patenting of tax
strategies. The House has now passed legislation banning tax patents
as part of a larger patent reform bill, but the Senate has yet to act.
17
Although foreign patent offices have not yet succumbed to the
inevitability of business method patents, the push for consistency has
16. See, e.g., Letter from Todd Welty, State Bar of Texas, to Eric Solomon, Treasury
Department (Jan. 29, 2007) (recommending that patented strategies be identified as
transactions of interest and patent applicants and holders be treated as material
advisors under the reportable transaction rules); Letter from the Virginia Society of
CPAs to AICIPA Chair Leslie Murphy (Oct. 6, 2006) (stating that patenting tax
advice does not represent good public policy); Alison Bennett, Colorado Bar Group
Opposes Tax Patenting, Voices Big Support for Legislative Remedy, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), Mar. 15, 2007, at G-1; Letter from Tax Section of the Florida Bar on
Patentability of Tax Advice and Senate Bill 681 to Senator Norm Coleman, Senator
Carl Levin & Senator Barack Obama (Apr. 23, 2007), at
http://www.floridataxlawyers.org/pdf/patentability taxadvice bi11681 .pdf; Brett
Ferguson, Efforts to Ban Tax Patents at Risk of Being Watered-Down in Congress,
Attorney Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 12, 2007, at G-8; John A. Squires,
Solution for Tax Patent Distemper Should be Transparency, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Oct. 12, 2007, at J-1.
17. See Alison Bennett, House Judiciary Panel Explains Stance On Tax Strategy
Patent Ban in New Report, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 6, 2007, at G- 1.; Hearing
on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. On Select
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong., 2d Sess.
(2006); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110 cong~bills&docid=
f:hl908eh.txt.pdf. This bill bans patents of tax strategies. Although it is on the
Senate legislative calendar, no action has taken place and there is no certainty
regarding potential Senate action. See Brett Ferguson, Efforts to Ban Tax Patents at
Risk of Being Watered-Down in Congress, Attorney Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Oct. 12, 2007, at G-8. Senators are also presenting their own plans to ban tax
patents. See Alison Bennett & Carol Oberdorfer, Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce
Measure to Curb Foreign Abuses, Stop Tax Patents, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Feb. 21,
2007, at G-2 (reporting the introduction of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act by
Senators Carl Levin, Barack Obama and Ron Coleman on February 17, 2007, a
stand-alone bill banning tax patents that differs from the Patent Reform Act in the
House). See also Alison Bennett, Baucus, Grassley, Others Crafting Legislation
Solely to Ban Tax Strategy Patents, Aides Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 13,
2007, at GG-1.
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resulted in their "fighting a losing rearguard action to resist such
patents."'
' 8
This essay considers this new U.S. phenomenon of patents on
tax planning strategies and in particular its possible implications for
the development of the integrated, globalized economy. As a tax
lawyer, I do not profess significant expertise in the area of patent law.
I believe that it is important, however, to consider the potential impact
on global markets and competition if patenting of such tax planning
strategies survives in the United States and is mimicked in other
jurisdictions as part of the drive towards harmonization of intellectual
property rules. As one group of commentators has noted,
[T]he grant of any patent is a troubling practice: patents
and other forms of intellectual property artificially raise
prices, restrain trade, and hamper access to what would
otherwise be a publicly available good. These costs of
exclusivity are typically justified as being outweighed
by the benefit of intellectual property as an incentive to
investment. 19
The issue here is whether the "troubling practice," in the international
context, imposes such distortive transaction costs and burdens on the
global marketplace that countries should take that cost into
consideration in deciding whether to permit patenting of tax strategies
or instead specifically to exclude tax planning methods from the scope
of patentable subject matter.
This essay proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief
overview of the current U.S. patent system. Part III addresses the most
significant concerns in connection with the recent issuance of tax
strategy patents. Part V considers briefly the international patent law
context and the current status of business methods patents in the U.S.'s
major trading partners, such as Europe and Japan. Part V then
considers the possibility that the U.S. position on patentability of tax
strategies may eventually be accepted abroad and ponders the
implications of that for a globalized economy. The essay concludes
18. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 14, at 3.
19. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 14, at 3.
36
with a tentative recommendation for international interpretation of
patent law requirements.
II. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
The primary benefit of a patent is the acceleration of inventions
that are socially useful, by means of a financial incentive to the
inventor that permits the inventor a means of recouping high research
and development costs. The incentive provided is a monopoly for a
relatively short period of time-20 years from filing. 20 The monopoly
cost of granting patents has been considered acceptable for two
principal reasons: the public can use the invention even during the
period of the monopoly for the price of the licensing fee, and the
invention becomes freely available to the public after the monopoly
period ends. 21 The publication of the issued patent is considered to
stimulate innovation built on the patent's new ideas even during the
monopoly period: "[o]thers can build upon the disclosure of a patent
instrument to produce their own technologies that fall outside the
exclusive rights associated with the patent."22 Furthermore, patents are
considered to facilitate market transactions, since they "decrease the
ability of contracting parties to engage in opportunistic behavior.,
23
Patents are therefore seen generally as of greater public benefit than
20. If a patent issues, the patent holder obtains the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling or offering to sell or importing the patented invention. 35
U.S.C. § 271(a). The maximum term is ordinarily 20 years from the date the patent
was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Those who use a patented technology without the
patentee's permission during the term of the patent may be sued for infringement.
21. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 The Rev. of Econ.
and Statistics 348 (1968); J.C. Dammann & Henry Hansmann, A Global Market for
Judicial Services (U. of Texas Law, Law and Econ Res. Paper No. 98,) (2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=976115.
22. Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Reform: Innovation Issues,
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, Order No. RL32996 (July 15,
2005), available
at http://tlc.usm.maine.edu/cli/documents/crs-report patentreform.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2007).
231d. at4.
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trade secrets, which do not result in public disclosure of useful
information.
Although patents are disclosed when issued, patent
applications remain secret for the first eighteen months after filing.
2 4
They are disclosed after that initial period, unless the applicant has
certified that there is no plan to seek foreign patent rights.
The patent process in the United States is "a largely insular
system shield[ed] from outside influence, with patents being granted
based on examinations by a single patent examiner with a limited
sphere of knowledge. 25 The basic requirements for patentability are a
suitable "process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof' that is useful, novel, and
nonobvious.26
The "process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter"
language defines patentable subject matter very broadly. In addition,
the U.S. Patent Act defines a patentable process circularly as a
"process, art or method., 27 Although abstract ideas or laws of nature
per se have never been considered patentable, 28 the USPTO has
applied broadly the 1998 State Street Bank decision, in which the court
24. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
25. Matthew John Duane, Lending a Hand: The Need for Public Participation in
Patent Examination and Beyond, at 1 (2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=970832.
26. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. Novelty is determined by whether the invention has
appeared in printed publications, has been available for public use or subject to sales,
patent or other patent applications. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(e). Nonobviousness does
not exist if the "differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art. 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a); See also In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (remanding case
in part to determine whether a business method patent for mandatory arbitration that
would fail as a mental process could satisfy the nonobviousness standard with the
addition of computers or modem communication devices).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
28. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable"). See also Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
broke with prior understanding by holding that business methods
could be patentable as practical applications that produce "a useful,
concrete and tangible result."29 Consequently, virtually any application
of rules that can be described in a series of steps resulting in some
combination of data or change of qualification can be patentable,
including calculations that are little more than mathematical
algorithms. The USPTO considers not only business methods but also
legal processes-applications of laws, including the federal income
tax laws-as a type of patentable process.
Contrary to what one might expect, the utility requirement does
not require the USPTO to consider whether the process itself actually
produces a public benefit: the invention merely must function so that
some party is helped to achieve the result claimed for the process.30 In
the face of sharp criticism of its decision to patent applications of tax
laws, the USPTO has, however, taken the position that patenting tax
strategies is advantageous because it facilitates public disclosure of
new methods rather than treating them as trade secrets maintained
confidentially.
3 1
The core requirements for a valid patent, and the ones that are
the most important for tax patents, are novelty and nonobviousness.
Novelty requires that the invention not be fully anticipated by a prior
patent or a publication or other knowledge that is within the public
domain. 32 Nonobviousness requires that the invention not have been
readily comprehended within the ordinary skills of a competent artisan
in the field at the time the invention was made.33 The Federal Circuit,
29. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30. See Juicy Whip, Inc. V. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(explaining USPTO need not reject a patent that has no public benefit; it is up to
congress to make those public policy decisions).
31. Wesley Everson Elmore, Tax Writers Scrutinize Patenting of Tax Strategies,
2006 TNT 135-3, July 14, 2006, available in LEXIS, TNT File (citing USPTO
executive Toupin).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).
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the federal court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
cases, has developed a fairly lax standard for testing obviousness,
resulting in a pro-applicant trend in grants of patents and a concern
that the quality of the granted patents has deteriorated.34
Although the patent examination process typically requires
only one patent examiner to review the application and search
available databases for prior art, the patent process does permit some
input from third parties. Third party participation, however, is very
costly, both in upfront fees for ex parte or intra partes examinations
(from about $2500 to more than $8000, respectively) and in potential
loss of valuable prior art references due to estoppel in later litigation.35
In practice, third party participation is very limited in use. As a result,
there is considerable commentary from academics and practitioners
regarding the decline in quality of patents issued, due to the patent
office's inability to conduct the in-depth review of materials with the
time and resources allotted. The issuance of more patents that will not
(or should not) stand the test of enforcement litigation distorts the
markets: infringers either bear extraordinary costs for litigating the
validity of the patent or pay the royalty to avoid the lawsuit, even
though they know the patent should not be considered valid.36 Even if
34. The Supreme Court has passed up several opportunities to hear patent cases, but
its decision in a recent case may have pushed back against the Federal Circuit's
obviousness standard. That case is KSR v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 U.S. 1727 (2007),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/04-1350.pdf The KSR
Court held that the Federal Circuit had applied a rigid and formulaic test that kept it
from recognizing ordinary inventiveness that should not be worthy of a patent. For a
discussion of the potential impact of the decision on issuance of business process
patents (and hence, on tax strategy patents), see also James W. Dabney & John F.
Duffy, Supreme Court Decision Could Thwart Business Process Patents, Executive
Counsel, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 19, available at
http://www.ffbsj.com/reprints/061120_execcounseldabney.pdf.
35. See, e.g., Duane, supra note 25(describing the points of possible intervention in
the patent process to show lack of novelty or nonobviousness in some detail).
36. "Poor patent quality may also encourage opportunistic behavior. Perhaps
attracted by large damages awards and a potentially porous USPTO, rent-seeking
entrepreneurs may be attracted to form speculative patent acquisition and
enforcement ventures. Industry participants may also be forced to expend
considerable sums on patent acquisition and enforcement. The net results would be
a patent is proven invalid, the patent holder may have already garnered
such a lead that its customers are "locked in" to the patent holder's
network of services. 37 These bad patents increase the rate of patent
litigation and influence the rise of "patent trolls" -a "derisive term
levied against parties who obtain patents for certain technologies but,
instead of producing end products from them, instead use them to
obtain licensing agreements and court settlements from other
companies in that arena." 3
8
Litigating patents costs at least in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars. 39 A 2000 report by the Congressional Research Service notes
that average costs of patent enforcement may be as high as $1.2
million, higher stakes litigation may cost as much as $4 million to
each party, and companies like Microsoft, with 35-40 cases a year,
may spend more than $100 million annually on patent litigation.4 °
It is not just competitors of patent holders who are affected.
Patent owners who do intend to use their patents to engage in
productive activities may make inappropriate decisions based on
expectations of exclusive rights. If their patent turns out to be invalid
after an enforcement proceeding, they will suffer a loss on their
investment, with no compensation. If this were to happen to a
significant number of patent holders, it would likely result in
decreased investments in innovative technologies.41
reduced rates of innovation, decreased patent-based transactions, and higher prices
for goods and services." Schacht & Thomas, supra note 22, at 6.
37. Stan Liebowitz, Network Effects, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and Digital
Copyright Issues, http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/ (last visited February 29,
2008). Liebowitz, who is a professor of economics at the University of Texas, has
been critical of lock-in and network effects theories.
38. Duane, supra note 25.
39. William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to
this Judicial Invention?, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 229, 293 (2007) (stating that typical patent
enforcement litigation costs $250,000 to $750,000).
40. Schacht & Thomas, supra note 22, at 7.
41. See Schacht & Thomas, supra note 22, at 7.
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III. CONCERNS ABOUT TAX STRATEGY PATENTS
There are a number of concerns about the application of the
patent system to tax law. Some of the general concerns about patents
are inapplicable to tax strategy patents: for example, the patent holder
who uses a patented tax strategy does not lose out on the investment if
the patent turns out to be invalid-the holder pays taxes owed on his
transactions, whether or not he has a patent governing the structure
used. Many of the general patent law concerns do apply, however, in
considering tax patents, especially those related to the inadequacy of
the patent office to the task of dealing with new domains. A number of
the concerns are unique to the tax law area. This section will explore
those concerns that seem most pressing for tax practitioners and tax
administrators.
Extending patent protection for either routine compliance with
tax laws or development of aggressive tax shelter transactions is
directly counter to sound tax policy and to the policies for encouraging
publicly beneficial innovation that underlie the patent system. First,
the explicit goal of patent law-to encourage innovation-runs
counter to public policy in the tax area. Tax innovations are simply not
subject to the public goods problem that prevents the creator from
charging enough for use of the strategy to recoup the research costs.
42
Tax practitioners who advise clients on transactional activities already
have every incentive to devise new strategies for their clients, since
that is the primary way in which they bring in new clientele. They
receive both monetary rewards (client payments) and status rewards
(reputations as brilliant tax planners) by devising workable tax
strategies.
Furthermore, in the case of aggressive tax planning strategies
that might be considered abusive, the patent goal of providing
economic returns to innovation through the grant of a monopoly is
simply inapplicable. There is no need to encourage tax practitioners to
innovate. In fact, incentivizing invention of new tax loophole
42. See David Olson, Patentable Subject Matter: The Problem of the Absent
Gatekeeper (Sept. 27, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=933167.
strategies runs counter to a strong public policy of discouraging the
existing rampant innovation in this area.
To respond to a spate of aggressive and perhaps illegal tax
shelter activity, Congress and the Treasury Department have
developed the reportable transaction regime, aimed at making tax
planning more transparent and reducing the economic incentives for
tax attorneys and other tax practitioners to develop tax loopholes.43
The reportable transaction regime and Circular 230 regulations for
practice before the Internal Revenue Service have combined new
disclosure rules, heightened standards for tax reporting and stiffer
penalties to make treatment of tax loopholes as "trade secrets" (which
are maintained through confidentiality agreements) too expensive to
be viable. The new regulations have eliminated the windfall possibility
of contingent fees for regular tax planning advice and pressured tax
practitioners to conduct a more thorough analysis of the tax law
requirements. Patents for tax strategies undermine this policy objective
by providing a way to maneuver around the reportable transaction
regulations. 44 Because aggressive tax planning strategies result in
lower revenues for the public fisc and/or higher taxes for those not
able to benefit from such strategies (resulting in inequities within the
tax system), providing patents to these aggressive planning strategies
undermines tax policy and does not promote socially beneficial
innovations, the underlying goal of the patent system.
In fact, patents for tax strategy may not only fail to serve a
positive public policy (encouraging innovation) but could actually
foster a damaging type of innovation. Tax laws change frequently, and
tax practitioners already pay particular attention to areas of change that
may be mined for new tax minimization strategies. In effect, tax
practitioners hope to arbitrage the technical wording of the provision
against the underlying purpose that Congress intended the provision to
accomplish. If they succeed, they will have a new shelter until
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a) (2007) and related regulations.
44. See Diane Freda, Attorneys Advised Tax Strategy Patents Nothing New, Daily
Tax Rep (BNA), Nov. 2, 2006, at G-12 (noting statement by Georgetown professor
Jay Thomas that tax attorneys say they use patents "so they don't have to make it
confidential"). But see infra note 47 and accompanying text discussing proposed
regulations requiring reporting of patented transactions.
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Congress or the Service acts to end it. Patents will exacerbate this
process by encouraging a race to file among tax practitioners dedicated
to examining new statutes, regulations, and case decisions for
exploitable loopholes in an effort to capture the rents to be gained
from each new change to the tax laws.
Large law firms, accounting firms and even investment banks
may have a distinct advantage in this process because of the numbers
of available associates who can be assigned to the creative task of
inventing ways to use the new provisions. It is quite possible that
certain large players will dominate the tax patent process and hold a
broad portfolio of patents, especially in particular areas, such as estate
and gift tax and financial transactions. The possibility of building
massive patent portfolios may also provide for tax patent trolls, willing
to buy up patents to exact fees from those who need to use the
patented process. These trolls would capitalize on the asymmetry of
their positions: They are not competitors subject to potential
counterclaims, but can legitimately threaten to halt use of a needed
strategy.45 Both consolidation and trolls would make it hard for small
firms or startups to find a niche, due to the extra transaction costs for
licensing tax strategies held by the big firms.
Second, the secrecy permitted for eighteen months of the
patent application process may assist tax practitioners in fending off
Service scrutiny of the patented strategy. Many U.S. patents on tax
strategies will undoubtedly be for domestic applications. Under
current law, such patent applications will likely remain undisclosed
until the patent is issued.4 Such secrecy may provide a way for tax
planners to avoid some of the transparency requirements developed to
counter the tax shelter business, though current developments suggest
the Service is aggressively monitoring that possibility. Prior to the
reportable transaction rules, many tax shelters were subject to
45. Schacht & Thomas, supra note 22, at 9, 34.
46. Tax strategies are generally not patentable in other countries, so it is currently
highly unlikely that a patent applicant would seek to patent the strategy abroad. As
cross-border transactions increase, however, pressure will grow to permit patenting
of tax strategies in both transaction jurisdictions, if U.S. tax strategy patents continue
to be permitted. See Young, infra note 76 and accompanying text.
confidentiality agreements that prevented various participants in the
transaction from disclosing the nature of the deal. Such confidentiality
agreements permitted tax shelter practitioners to avoid tax scrutiny on
the deal by taking advantage of both the low numbers of audits and the
difficulty of detection of issues on audits (the so-called "audit
lottery"). The deal could be sold to a relatively small number of
taxpayers without drawing government attention. The reportable
transaction rules were developed in part to mandate disclosure for
transactions covered by confidentiality agreements. Without mandated
transparency, transactions covered by patent applications would have a
grace period during which time the transaction remained secret but not
subject to the reportable transaction rules. The Service, however, has
recently issued proposed regulations that designate a new category of
reportable transactions for patented transactions.47
Even if tax patents are not used for aggressive transactions and
the Service receives notice after it finalizes the new reportable
transaction regulations, the eighteen-month interval between filing an
application and public disclosure could be problematic for advisers
and taxpayers. The timing of tax advice and the patent process could
well result in tax advisers initiating a transaction structure with a client
while the patent application is pending and secret, causing the client to
infringe on the patent when it issues, unless the prior use exception is
available.48
Third, the advent of business and legal method patents, and in
particular of tax method patents, is especially worrisome because of
47. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4, 72 Fed. Reg. 54615-54618 (Sept. 26, 2007)
(adding a "patented transactions category" and applying to taxpayers under § 6011,
material advisors responsible for disclosing under § 6111 and material advisors
required to maintain lists under § 6112). Under the regulations, a patented
transaction includes any one for which a taxpayer pays a fee to a patent holder or the
holder's agent for the right to use a tax planning method subject to a patent or any
one in which a taxpayer who is the patent holder or patent holder's agent has a right
to payment for another's use of a patented tax planning method. See also Alison
Bennett, Definitional Issues Loom in Circular 230, Tax Patent Areas, Treasury
Officials Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 23, 2007, at G-7.
48. William C. Weinsheimer & Barry L. Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights in
Estate Tax Strategies, ABA Section of Taxation 2007 Midyear Meeting, Estate and
Gift Tax Committee (Jan. 19, 2007).
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the lack of expertise of the USPTO staff in federal income tax law. As
everyone knows, tax law is extraordinarily complex. Tax practitioners
require years of practice before they can be considered experts, and
even then, they generally work primarily in limited domains of the tax
law, such as in partnership, corporate, or financial product taxation.
The Service has considerable difficulty finding experts who will
remain in government and are capable of reverse-engineering the
various financial transactions and tax strategies used by sophisticated
taxpayers to minimize their taxes. The USPTO engineers and patent
examiners are aware of their own lack of tax expertise in the tax law,
but they have neither the funding nor the focus to develop the depth of
expertise that would be required to become sufficiently competent in
recognizing prior art in tax planning.49 The USPTO has a shortage of
examiners, a constantly increasing number of applications, a growing
backlog, limited search tools, sparse disclosures by applicants, and a
limited amount of time for processing (roughly eighteen hours per
application).5 °
Fourth, the potential for issuance of tax strategy patents for
methods that have been common knowledge within the tax community
is very high. Even with additional input and training from the Service
and interested practitioners through the American Bar Association, the
USPTO remains unprepared to assess the subtleties of sophisticated
tax planning strategies. Furthermore, many of the discussions of tax
strategies take place within practitioner organizations or academic
gatherings and may not lead to publication in a database that the
USPTO relies on for searches for prior art. 51 The fact that most tax
minimization planning is done on a one-on-one basis between a tax
adviser and a client, subject to the attorney-client privilege, further
complicates the issue. Thus, the attorney is under an obligation to
49 Joint Comm. on Taxation, Background & Issues Relating to the patenting of Tax
Advice, JCX-31-06 (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-31-
06.pdf.
50. Duane, supra note 25, at n. 63.
51. See Michael Brier, Patently Foolish?, Fin. Adviser, Oct. 2007, available at
http://www.fa-mag.com/past issues.php?idcontent=3&idArticle= 1 333&idPastlssue
=114 (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
refrain from discussing his client's transactions and their tax
consequences and cannot divulge those facts to establish prior art and
prevent another from benefiting from a patent. Either the attorney
must secure permission from a client to reveal information about the
client's use of the strategy, or the practitioner must argue in abstract
terms that do not satisfy the USPTO's requirements for conclusive
evidence about prior use. This is particularly problematic, since the
remedies for patent infringement suits, which are already costly to
defend, can be substantial (including treble damages for willful
infringement).52 This will likely continue to present a critical problem
for tax strategy patents.
To illustrate the mismatch of skills and required analysis in this
area, an example that has garnered significant media and practitioner
attention is the SOGRAT patent. The USPTO issued a patent for a
common kind of trust, a grantor retained-annuity trust or "GRAT",
that is funded by stock options: the SOGRAT patent.53 Various
taxpayers, including at least fourteen large law firms, have paid license
fees to the holder of the patent to use the SOGRAT. Yet, most
experienced tax practitioners do not consider the combination of these
two common tax ideas as novel. One academic commentator, William
Drennan, provides an extensive discussion of the many ways in which
the SOGRAT would be considered an obvious option to most estate
and gift tax practitioners:
[I]f stock options represent a significant portion of a
client's wealth and the estate will be liable for estate
taxes at death, one could argue that a person having
ordinary skill in the art of estate planning would review
the standard group of estate planning devices that can
reduce a taxable estate, include the GRAT. Prior to the
filing of the patent application for the SOGRAT, the
prior art stated that assets that can significantly
52. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
53. See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) (issued May 20, 2003). The
patent is the subject of Wealth Transfer Group LLC v. Rowe, No. 3:06-cv-00024 (D.
Conn. filed Jan. 6, 2006).. See also Stephen Joyce, Federal Case Highlights Debate
Over Patenting of Tax Strategies, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), July 18, 2006, at G-5.
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appreciate in value, including stock, are excellent
candidates for contribution to a GRAT. Accordingly,
one could argue that there was a 'teaching, suggestion
or incentive' to contribute stock options to a GRAT.
54
Moreover, the issuance of patents for tax strategies will tend to
stifle the communications among tax practitioners (both lawyers and
accountants), in contrast to the current culture, which provides for
vigorous debate among experts about the pros and cons of particular
tax strategies.55 Such discussions permit practitioners to develop a
better sense of what may be permissible under the Internal Revenue
Code. The loss of a productive interchange would be deleterious for
tax practitioners, who will lose one of the means of gaining expertise
through communications with more experienced lawyers in the field,
and for taxpayers, whose advisers will not have the benefit of the
collegial analyses of tax strategies. The Service will also lose out,
since the discussions provide an excellent opportunity for tax experts
to comment on Service positions and, in many cases, provide
examples of practical limitations or applications of which the Service
might not be aware.
In addition to economic and procedural concerns, tax strategy
patents raise a number of ethical issues for tax practitioners. A lawyer
who files patent applications on tax strategies will need to consider
whether the strategy belongs to the client for whom it was developed
and whether the practitioner has an ethical duty to suggest that the
client patent the strategy or, at least, to disclose the lawyer's intent to
file. The lawyer will have to consider the patent in determining the
reasonableness of fees for the work done for the client. 56 If the lawyer
has developed the strategy outside of a client context, the lawyer may
have violated conflict of interest rules in proposing the patented
strategy or in charging unreasonable fees for its use.57 In particular, tax
54. William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to
this Judicial Invention?, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 229, 266 (2007).
55. See Weinsheimer & Grossman, supra note 48.
56. See Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.5.
57. See Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.7.
48
lawyers who hold tax strategy patents and provide a license to other
attorneys will have to carefully consider whether the licensing
agreement constitutes a "promoter" tax opinion subject to the special
reportable transaction rules and the stringent standards for written
opinions under the regulations governing practice before the Service
(commonly referred to as "Circular 230,,).58 These various ethical
issues may exact a significant transaction cost for deals that are
governed by one or more patents and may result in faulty compliance
that undermines these rules.
Finally, a concern expressed by many commentators relates to
the unique status of tax law as a mandatory system to which everyone
is subject and with which all are expected to comply through a
voluntary filing system. Because of the importance of voluntary
compliance, and as a matter of fundamental fairness, the tax laws
purport to treat equally-situated taxpayers the same. If a patent holder
holds a patent on a central tax minimization strategy, it may be that
some taxpayers will forego using the strategy rather than pay the
royalty to do so. In the case of tax strategies that are straightforward
realizations of the potential enacted by Congress in the tax code, tax
patents (other than compliance and tax preparation software patents)
appear particularly noxious because they essentially will result in a
"toll charge" to taxpayers, undoing the tax savings that adherence to
the Code provisions would otherwise provide. Patent holders would
essentially be permitted to extract economic rent from other tax
practitioners and taxpayers for routine tax planning. Some
commentators consider this to amount to "privatization of the tax
laws" that may "deny the taxpayers unrestricted access to the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code., 59 "Privatization" of the tax
58. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.27, 10.29.
59. Weinsheimer & Grossman, supra note 48, at 14; John R. Thomas, The Patenting
of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1165 (1999) (noting that State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial, Inc. involved a claim very closely worded
after the applicable tax statute and regulations). State Street Bank involved
partnerships of regulated investment companies and data processing methods that
permitted daily and year-end determinations of each partner's share of investment
returns. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
49
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laws calls into question the equitable treatment required under the tax
laws and may cause taxpayers to blame the tax laws for the inequities,
rather than the patent laws. The New York State Bar Association Tax
Section expressed this concern bluntly: "We do not believe that it is
sound policy to force taxpayers to choose between paying more tax
than they are legally obligated to pay and paying royalties to a third
party who has patented a tax strategy."
60
Patents in these cases would be particularly offensive if no
licenses were granted, thus excluding taxpayers from using the
strategy. In an extreme case, if a patent holder is able to amass a
portfolio of patents that effectively "corners the market" on particular
types of transactions or activities and subsequently refuses to license
those strategies to competitors, Congress will have limited ability to
direct economic activity through legislation. Patent holders will have
enormous power over other taxpayers' ability to comply with the tax
laws; the situation would be equivalent to "government issued barbed
wire. ' 61 It is even possible that refusals to license could result in
taxpayers being unable to benefit from a subsidy intended by Congress
for particular types of business. One example would be where the
patent related to a new provision of the Code that established a tax
incentive and there was, for all practical purposes, no other manner of
satisfying the provision than through the process set out in the patent
claims. In each case, the existence of a tax strategy patent undermines
the voluntary compliance system that is the backbone of the federal
income tax.
It is possible that the negative picture drawn here misses some
benefits of the patent system unique to tax. There are two main
benefits that could accrue to a tax strategy patent system: earlier
notice to the Service of aggressive strategies and higher transaction
62
costs that discourage some aggressive tax planning. Regarding the
notice issue, some commentators have argued that the disclosure of
60. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Patentability of Tax Advice, at 2
(Aug. 17, 2006).
61. Paul Devinksy et al., Whose Tax Law Is It? Alarm Bells Should Ring Over Rising
Efforts to Patent Tax Strategies, Legal Times, Oct. 16, 2006.
62. See, e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 14, at 14-15.
many patent applications after eighteen months, and of all issued
patents, will help the Service discover state-of-the art tax planning
strategies more quickly, permitting it to respond to and stifle super-
aggressive transactions at an earlier stage. This would be true
particularly if Congress amended the Patent Act to permit the USPTO
to confer with the Service about particular applications or to share any
tax strategy applications with the Service ab initio, although it could
be hindered by the USPTO's inability to appropriately categorize an
application as dealing with a tax planning strategy. 63 The Service's
proposed regulations requiring reporting of patented transactions also
directly address the notice issue, to the extent that compliance can be
assured.64
Paying royalties to use tax strategies may discourage some
taxpayers, but it is likely that the typical taxpayer willing to hire tax
advisers to devise a tax-minimization strategy for a transaction would
be ready to pay the additional licensing fee if there was still a net gain
from tax minimization. The reduced tax savings might act to
discourage a few taxpayers at the margin (resulting in the inequities
discussed above), but it would not be expected to have a significant
impact on tax minimization practices.
IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE TREND TOWARDS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW HARMONIZATION
In our increasingly integrated, high technology, global
economy, inventions are not easily contained within national
jurisdictions.65 There is growing demand for patent protection across
jurisdictions and concern that a patent granted in one jurisdiction will
not be sufficient to protect inventors' interests. Seeking additional
patent protections in other jurisdictions, however, can add
considerable complexity and greatly increase transaction costs without
63. See supra note 47. This, of course, presents the problem of which type of law is
superior. Does patent law preempt tax law, or does tax law preempt patent law?
64. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
65. Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding the
Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 281, 281-283 (2007).
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an internationally recognized patent system. Differences in national
laws affect ownership of the patent and what post-issuance remedies
may exist.
66
Although there is currently no global patent system, the move
towards intellectual property law harmonization includes patent
developments. The TRIPS agreement provides a broad statement
about global protection for inventions (including processes). Despite
TRIPS, there are a number of persisting differences in U.S. patent law
and international standards, including first-inventor-to-file-priority,
application disclosure, prior user rights, and post-issuance opposition
short of litigation. Current patent reforms in the United States
Congress specifically address a number of these issues in order to
harmonize U.S. patent law more closely with prevailing international
law.
67
As for our particular topic here-the question of the validity of
tax strategy patents as a sub-category of business method patents,
there is considerable disagreement about the interpretation of the
obligation under TRIPS Article 27.1, which requires that signatory
nations provide protection for "any inventions, whether product or
processes, in all fields of technology."
68
The USPTO views its obligations under the TRIPS agreement
as demanding nondiscrimination among various subject matters.69 The
66 Schacht & Thomas, supra note 22, at 8.
67. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007)(introduced by
Senators Leahy and Hatch); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
(2007). The current U.S. system awards patents to the first to invent, but European
patents are awarded to the first to file. Should this bill be enacted, the U.S. patent
system would comport with the European requirements, causing some to question
whether small inventors will be more easily squeezed out of the system because of
lesser resources and the possibility of corporate espionage.
68. See supra note 2.
69. See, e.g., Karen Ferriter, Overview of U.S. Patents: TRIPS and U.S. Patent
Examination (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Nov. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/conf gipa2007nov2/tripsandpatents.
ppt#291,1,OVERVIEW OF PATENTS: TRIPS and US PATENT EXAMINATION
(describing TRIPS' non-discrimination provision and equating TRIPS' requirements
with the US court's test); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, "Request for Comments
nondiscrimination claim is that the treaty requires all member nations'
patent systems to be technology-neutral in approving patents and
prohibits amendments to the U.S. Patent Act that would create patent-
free subject matter areas. 70 If patents are issued, the TRIPS agreement
requires the full panoply of remedies. One commentator therefore
suggests that Congress's recent amendment to the Patent Act
permitting patents of medical methods but not permitting enforcement
actions may not be in compliance with TRIPS.7' In addition,
commentators have argued that traditional U.S. patent principles and
general international concepts of patents do not support carving out
business or legal process methods as ineligible for patents.72 If the
on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive Requirements of Patent
Laws", Mar. 19, 2001 Fed. Reg. 15409-15411 (stating that the technological
requirement in other countries' patent laws is more restrictive than the "useful,
concrete, and tangible" test applied under U.S. patent law). Brian Kahin reported in
comments on the 2001 roundtable patent discussions that the U.S. government was
insisting that "patents should be available for any fields, not just technology" and
was threatening to walk out of discussions if other countries didn't agree. Brian
Kahin, Comments Concerning Institutional Roles at the October 25 Roundtable,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/kahinsupp.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Browyn Hall, Business Method Patents, Innovation and Policy (2003),
available at
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Patents/BusinessMethodPatents.pdf
(indicating that the TRIPS agreement does not permit exclusion of business method
patents, and citing B. Diallo, "Historical perspectives on IP protection for software
in selectedcountries worldwide," 25 World Patent Information 19 (2003). See
generally Edita Petnycyte, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to Business
Methods, 3 Intern'l J. of Baltic Law 114 (2004), available at www.ceeol.com
(comparing and contrasting the U.S., European, and Japanese approach to business
method patents).
71. See Thomas, supra note 59 at 1142 (suggesting that any effort to deny
patentability to particular "spheres of activity" is "unlikely to succeed"). But see 35
U.S.C. §287(c) (1999) (Physicians Immunity Statute generally denies damages or
injunctive relief against licensed medical practitioners or related health care
facilities).
72. See, e.g., Gregory J. Maier, An "Opposition " to the Recently-Proposed
Legislation Related to Business Method Patents, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info.
L. 397, 412 (2002); Symposium, Do Overly Broad Patents Lead to Restrictions on
Innovation and Competition?, 15 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 947, 957-
58 (2005) (quoting Mary Critharis of the USPTO); John A. Squires & Thomas S.
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United States ultimately concludes that the TRIPS agreement requires
the patenting of business methods or tax strategies, there may be
increased pressure on U.S. trading partners to adopt similar
protections, as in the case of bilateral agreements for protection of
copyrighted subject matter.7 3
Differing perspectives exist in which other commentators have
suggested that the TRIPS language should not be read so broadly as to
include business methods and legal processes. The nature of the
process, in the case of business methods and legal processes, does not
appear to be the kind of industrial application that was intended to be
covered by the TRIPS agreement or, indeed, by the "useful Arts"
language of the U.S. Constitution.Business methods relate to
commercial activities rather than to the technology fields referenced in
the TRIPS agreement; therefore, they should be excludible as a result
of their ineligible subject matter for patents.74 Accordingly, John
Thomas suggests that patents should be restricted to industrial
applications by patenting only "advances to the repeatable production
or transformation of material objects., 75 In fact, many of the
developed countries have attempted to draw the line at patenting
business methods based on similar arguments about suitable subject
76matter. The Eurpoean Patent Convention grants patents for
Biemer, Patent law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean That the
USPTO is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject Matter Question Right?, 46 Idea
561, 562 (2006) (arguing that any technological arts requirement is bogus and
business methods should be patentable).
73 See, e.g., Australia-US Free Trade Agreement,, art. 17.4.5, May 18, 2004,
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Australia- FTA/Final-Text/a
sset uploadfile469_5141.pdf (the section on intellectual property grants
protections to copyrighted subject matter similar to those provided in the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act).
74. See Drennan, supra note 54, 40-44, n. 194.
75. Thomas, supra note59, at 1143, 1178-79 (noting that Europe and Japan rely on
industrial applications to limit patent subject matter). But note that the USPTO has
moved in the opposite direction, issuing guidelines in late 2005 that effectively
eliminated its "technological arts" standard for patent issuance. See Joint Committee
on Taxation, supra note 49, at 9.
innovations that are "susceptible of industrial application. '77  The
Convention specifically excludes specific types of subject matter
relating to "schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers": the
exclusions cannot be avoided merely by including an additional
feature that is not within the enumerated exclusions. 78 The substance
of the invention must be technical to make the invention eligible for
patent protections.
As a result of these current restrictions abroad, U.S. companies
have a competitive advantage, at least as far as using patented business
method processes domestically. For example, U.S. law imposes a
higher barrier to competition than the patent law of other developed
countries. Tax practitioners, however, spend a considerable amount of
time developing cross-border transaction structures. It is logical to
anticipate that if domestic patents continue to be approved and become
more commonplace, tax practitioners will lobby for patentability
abroad in order to achieve consistent protection for all elements of the
cross-border tax strategies. This may create pressure on U.S. trading
partners to permit patenting of business, legal and tax methods.
Consequently, some commentators believe that the practice in other
countries towards business method patents will change over time.
7 9
76. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual Property Law 308-09 (2001)
(discussing the 1973 European Patent convention Article 52(2), which indicates that
business methods are not eligible subject matter for patents) (discussed in Drennan,
supra note 54, at 42, n. 99); Jeffrey E. Young, Patenting of Financial Business
Methods Gains Momentum, 11 Elec. Banking L. & Com. Rep. 12 (2006) (indicating
that the European and Japanese Patent Offices will not patent business methods per
se, and require computer-implemented business process to have technical features,
and also noting some lack of clarity as to what sorts of claims will be considered by
the Canadian Patent Office).
77. European Patent Convention, art. 52(1) (2000), available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/ar52.html.
78. European Patent Convention, art. 52(2)(c) and art. 52(3) (2000).
79. See Young, supra note 76, at 5 (noting that many other countries permit delays in
application that might make it worthwhile to await developments in business method
application approvals).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF TAx STRATEGY PATENTS FOR GLOBALIZED
MARKETS
Economic analysis can shed light on the relative benefit of
issuing patents on tax planning technologies, especially in the
international context. Will tax strategy patents encourage or
discourage engagement in productive cross-border activity? Will
patents encourage or discourage useful innovation that will permit
businesses to more easily transact across borders? Will patents
encourage or discourage market concentration? Are there concerns in
the international context about privatization of methods of compliance
with tax laws that override whatever advantage there may be to
accelerate innovation of tax-advantageous international transaction
structures? Many of the domestic problems for tax strategy patents
have global counterparts that may be intensified in the international
context.
First, it seems clear that the policy of fostering innovation is as
questionable in the international context as in the domestic one. The
cadre of tax practitioners who advise on advantageous tax structuring
for cross-border deals are already among the elite in the field and
enjoy strong reputations for their expertise in corporate structure,
dividend and consolidation requirements, and withholding rules of
various jurisdictions. They are required to familiarize themselves with
the relevant tax laws in a number of jurisdictions, and develop tax
minimization strategies that take into account both U.S. and foreign
tax laws, especially for cross-border acquisitions and reorganizations.
Their reward is their reputation for understanding the international
context and the clients and fees that follow. Perhaps even more than in
the purely domestic context, cross-border tax innovations are readily
available, widely shared among tax practitioners at conferences and
seminars, and amply rewarded in the marketplace. Thus, the need for
patents to create incentives for innovation in this area is particularly
lacking.
If most countries permit tax strategy patents, it is likely that
those strategies will fall both within the routine and the super-
aggressive types that are currently at issue in the United States. To the
extent that the innovation involves acceptable means of complying
with all applicable laws, universal granting of tax strategy patents is
particularly worrisome in the cross-border context. In cross-border
deals, there may be a more limited number of reasonable ways for
enterprises to structure various kinds of transactions, such as spin-offs,
stock acquisitions, and other types of reorganizations in order to
operate efficiently in various jurisdictions within a suitable tax
structure. Patents on those limited means will at the least add to the
transactional costs of undertaking a cross-border deal.
The cross-border context enhances the ability of patent trolls to
control access to legal methods of structuring transactions. If a patent
holder monopolizes those strategies by failing to grant licenses to
competitors, it may permit the patent holder to enjoy an enormous
competitive advantage that unfairly skews the marketplace in the
patent holder's favor. 80 Smaller potential competitors may find the
marginal increase in costs of engaging in the transaction sufficient to
turn a potential profit into a loss. Larger competitors may choose to
restructure through alternative, "second-best" strategies, but still incur
significantly higher costs, impeding competition with the patent
holder. Similar concerns would apply for exit strategies, in that the
patent holder might be able to cut its losses appropriately, but its main
competitors might delay their exit too long due to their inability to use
the most beneficial tax-saving strategy. 8' As one commentator noted,
"you don't compete by outlawing your competition."82  The
deadweight loss to society from stifled competition may be significant,
and the tax policies of both jurisdictions in the international
transaction may be stymied.83
80. Paul Devinsky et al., To Practice Tax law, You Need a Patent License,
IPLaw360 (2006).
81. Id.
82. James Surowiecki, Patent Bending, The New Yorker, July 14, 2003, at 36,
available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/07/14/030714tatalk_surowiecki (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007).
83. One feature of tax laws may make this doomsday scenario less likely. Tax laws
tend to change much more rapidly than other legal systems-as economic conditions
change or societies develop new competencies, legislatures and tax administrators
tweak the tax laws to better suit the new environment. Thus, what is a good strategy
worth patenting one year may become virtually useless a short time later. In effect,
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The proliferation of tax strategy patent rights may also result in
under-use of reasonable tax strategies for cross-border deals. If
multiple patents for component structuring techniques are held by a
disparate group of patentees in multiple jurisdictions, the entrepreneur
planning a cross-border deal must undertake complex negotiations for
multiple licenses. Since planning often has a number of false starts,
there could be duplicative phases of such negotiations. The diverse
patent holders could possibly demand excessive rents, while the
multiple negotiations with patent holders in different jurisdictions
would be more expensive to conduct and more likely to break down
due to failures in communication or simply different market
perspectives. 84 Highly fragmented rights, in other words, would likely
result in very high transaction costs for negotiating a deal. This is the
problem of the anti-commons-too many property rights, so that the
commons itself is underutilized.85 In the case of smaller companies or
start-ups, the additional resource needs might tip the balance against
carrying out the transaction.
Where the patent involves aggressive structuring or cross-
border tax shelter planning, provision of the monopoly incentive
offered by patent law may be even more inappropriate in a cross-
border context than it is in a domestic context. Bilateral tax treaties
attempt to provide reasonable policy results that reconcile the two
the rapid change of tax laws may limit the term of the patent monopoly and thus
limit the negative effects otherwise likely from patenting tax strategies.
84. See Vincent Chiappetta, TRIP-ping Over Business Method Patents, 37 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 181 (2004) (arguing that attempts to harmonize business method
patents on the global stage is misguided, in part because savings in the cost of
transactions will not be realized). See also John Gladstone Mills III, A Transactional
Patent Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J.
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 83, 92-93 (2002) (noting the flip-side of this point with
the high costs of acquiring patent protection and enforcing those patents in multiple
jurisdictions).
85.See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 624 (1998); Michael A.
Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)(discussing the ability of excessive
rents to destroy innovation); Burk & McDonnell, supra note 14, at 12.
contracting jurisdictions. The general goal of such treaties is that
business income should be taxed by one or the other jurisdiction-it
should not be double-taxed, but it should not avoid taxation altogether.
Patented tax strategies may attempt to exploit inconsistencies in the
laws of both jurisdictions to achieve zero taxation. 86 It may be more
possible to achieve such a result in the multiple-jurisdiction patented
strategy context if the patent application procedures permit
customizing the description of the strategy in ways that conceal rather
than reveal the process. The possibility of monopoly awards for such
harmful activities may well spur the creation of more evasive tax
strategies, which in turn will continue to raise the visibility of the tax
minimization norm. In spite of patent law's claims of enhancing
disclosure of inventions, such patents would undermine the attempt by
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which has focused particularly on tax havens
and information sharing to increase transparency of cross-border
transactions.8 7 The end result may be to elevate tax avoidance and
erode the perceived importance of tax compliance.
The same concerns about the potential for issuance of poor
quality patents exist in the international context as in the domestic
context, with perhaps even more serious consequences. If patent
protections for tax strategies become common across most of the
jurisdictions in which multinational companies operate, it will mean a
surge in patent applications and issuances across the board as
companies attempt to get into a position in which they will not be
denied access to advantageous strategies by competitors holding
patents or in which they at least hold an arguably valid patent for
similar strategies that can form a countersuit against any claim. As in
86. See Mariano Municoy, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the
Models Developed by the Hague Conference in Private International Law:
Asymmetric Countries and the Relationship of Private Parties, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell.
Prop. 342, 374 (2005) (describing the forum shopping that takes place when
jurisdictions have differing patent laws).
87. See, e.g., OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf; OECD, The OECD's
Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Report (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf.
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the domestic case, it is likely that foreign patent offices will face
difficult analysis and resource demands to review tax strategy patent
applications. As poor quality patents are issued, patent litigation is
likely to increase at a great cost to patent holders and patent infringers
alike. There is perhaps a more substantial risk that the threatened costs
of patent litigation will keep smaller companies from attempting to
develop a similar tax strategy and may even pressure those companies
to forego international expansion plans. The aggregate effect of these
problems again may be to discourage participation of small companies
and startups in the globalized markets, leaving the stage to the well-
resourced multinationals that will resultantly have more control over
market pricing because of the limited competition. The many patents
issued may further confuse taxpayers who strive to comply with the
law, because they may perceive patented strategies as producing the
results claimed whether or not the strategies would be legitimate under
the tax laws. That confusion could lead to poorer compliance with tax
laws overall.
Another potential misuse of patents is further exaggerated in
the cross-border context. Commentators note that companies can use
cross-licensing agreements 88 as court-enforceable controls for cartel
pricing. Without patents, competitors' efforts to form a cartel would
likely fail, but with cross-licensing, license fees are used to punish
cartel cheaters, resulting in monopolies that are wider in scope than the
original patent protection intended.89 Cross-licensing of tax strategy
patents among a select group of companies could be used to control
entry and exit into one or more national markets. If those companies
also cross-license their operating business patents (e.g., business
methods, manufacturing), they would have a formidable international
cartel.90
88. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-licensing (defining cross-
licensing as the reciprocal provision of patent rights between parties each holding a
patent whose use is desired by the other party, without payment of a fee or other
royalty) (last visited May 3, 2008).
89. Olson, supra note 42, at 66.
90. Id.
The harms outlined above-additional transaction costs for all
parties planning a cross-border transaction, proliferation of tax
minimization strategies and possibly of tax shelter strategies at a cost
to each jurisdiction's fisc, concentration of industries through refusal
to grant licenses, and further concentration through granting of many
"bad" patents that permit patentees to establish a foothold earlier than
their competitors-represent in some sense the ordinary costs for
patent systems but writ large because of the way tax efficiencies
influence all aspects of business structuring. The patent law assumes
that the tradeoff for the spur to innovation is the grant of a monopoly
and the potential blow to competitiveness that grant provides, but it
also assumes that the accelerated benefit of the invention, the
relatively short period of the monopoly (20 years), and the disclosure
provided by patent publication will sufficiently counter those harms. Is
there a sufficient difference of scale or nature here to justify the
European position against business method patents, or does the cost-
benefit balance favor the U.S. "anything goes" position?
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, acceleration of tax minimization strategies is not
needed and is on balance much more likely to be harmful to society
rather than beneficial. The 20-year period for a monopoly is an eon in
tax terms-even a few years of delayed entry into a market because of
tax disadvantages can lock in the competitive advantage of the
monopolizer for years. The disclosure provided by the patent
application may have some benefits to tax authorities, but it is not
significantly more than they can currently require through reporting
rules. It is unlikely to have much benefit to the public, since only those
tax experts who already spend considerable time ferreting out the
details of complicated tax provisions can reverse-engineer the complex
strategies, and those are the ones already competing to be first to
develop new loophole strategies. The rush to file a patent will likely
lead to enormous consolidation of the firms that file tax strategy
patents and similar concentration among industries where tax-
advantageous structuring of multinational transactions is especially
important. The proliferation of tax strategy patents will further erode
public compliance, both because of the potential confusion engendered
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by the issuance of many patents for invalid tax strategies and because
of the heightened visibility of tax minimization strategies generally
and the expansion of the tax minimization norm as an understanding
of the proper approach to tax law. There simply appears to be no
public benefit from offering tax strategy patents but considerable
public detriment. The European position is the better one, and the
United States would be well advised to harmonize its patent law with
the European law in this respect, by requiring an industrial application
for patentability
